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Abstract 
 
Metamorphic virus employs code obfuscation techniques to mutate itself. It absconds 
from signature-based detection system by modifying internal structure without 
compromising original functionality. However, it has been proved that machine learning 
technique like Hidden Markov model (HMM) can detect such viruses with high 
probability. HMM is a state machine where each state observes the input data with 
appropriate observation probability. HMM learns statistical properties of “virus features” 
rather than “signatures” and relies on such statistics to detect same family virus. Each 
HMM is trained with variants of same family viruses that are generated by same 
metamorphic engine so that HMM can detect similar viruses with high probability when 
encountered later on.  
 
Previous HMM-based detection techniques have relied on opcode sequences which are 
obtained by disassembling the binary (executable) code. Such an approach is 
impractical, since the disassembly process is slow, and this process must be applied to 
each file when scanning for viruses. In this paper, we develop a practical HMM-based 
metamorphic virus detector. We efficiently parses a Windows PE file and generate an 
approximate opcode sequence which is then used for scoring against the HMM. The 
results show that our method produce opcode sequences effectively, eliminate time-
consuming disassembling phase, reduce training time of HMM by 70% and produce 
clear separation of scores between family virus and non-members. 
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1. Introduction 
In today’s electronically connected digital world, data is stored in the connected 
storages and shared globally. Modern technology has changed the way we learn, work, 
play, and live but it does not offer luxury of high availability and accessibility without 
endangering the security and privacy of information. No matter how secure data is 
stored and accessed, information still get stolen. Everyday and every second, 
somebody in the world has his/her identity and money seized. Even worse, information 
which is worth lots of time, energy, and resources is completely wiped out by malicious 
programs causing huge loss. As we all understand, the modern digital world poses 
multifaceted vulnerabilities, a major concern is to protect data from being corrupted or 
destroyed by malicious codes.  
Malicious code is “any code added, changed, or removed from a software system to 
intentionally cause harm or subvert the system's intended function" (Jordan, 2002).  
Malicious code can be classified as virus, worm, Trojan, backdoors, and so on. 
Although all malicious codes are commonly called virus, each of the above term mean a 
type of attack the malicious code perform. For our purpose, we refer the commonly 
used term ‘virus’ to address all malicious codes in discussion for this project. Computer 
viruses have been consistently evolving. Each new generation of viruses poses new 
challenges for antivirus developers.  Fortunately, antivirus developers do rise to the 
challenges and devises a method to protect data from viruses as they show up. 
Our research focuses on a specific type of virus called metamorphic virus that uses 
obfuscating techniques to mutate itself. We will discuss further about detecting 
metamorphic viruses and enhancing one of the detection technique called Hidden 
Markov Models (HMM).  
The organization of this report is as follows; Section 2 covers viruses and their types 
with an emphasis on metamorphic virus (with examples); Section 3 covers available 
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detection techniques with an emphasis on HMM; Section 4 covers our research on 
detecting metamorphic viruses more practically and efficiently using HMM; Section 5 
covers the training and testing of HMM; and finally, Section 6 covers the discussion of 
results.  
Figure 1 shows number of new malicious threats every year.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. New Malicious Code threats  
Source:   Turner et al., 2008 
 
2.  Viruses and their types 
Viruses are malicious programs that have threatened the world of computers for about 
thirty years; and will be more challenging than ever before. As the modern viruses 
present new challenges, the antivirus community is constantly putting efforts to 
understand, learn, and develop new antivirus kits to detect and remove viruses. There 
are many types of viruses with different risk levels we have discovered.  
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Some of well known viruses are  
• Boot sector virus  
• Polymorphic virus  
• Macro virus  
• Metamorphic virus  
 
The following section explains in-depth details of metamorphic virus followed by brief 
introduction to other viruses. 
2.1  Metamorphic Virus  
Metamorphic viruses are viruses that mutate itself with the use of metamorphic engine 
that come along with virus code. These viruses are a new generation of viruses that 
escape signature detection techniques, as the shape of virus body is changed every 
time when it infects. To explain in short, metamorphic viruses mutate its body and 
change the internal structure preserving the functionality of virus.  
Such metamorphism is employed by obfuscating the code using different techniques. 
Five of the techniques are listed below (Mohammed, 2003). 
• Simple Substitution  
• Instruction Reordering  
• Dead code Insertion  
• Register usage exchange  
• Reordering subroutines  
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Figure 2 shows different shapes of virus body in each mutation (Szor, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Different forms of a metamorphic virus  
Source:   Szor, 2001 
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2.1.1  Simple Substitution  
This technique allows for the substitution of an instruction or a block of code with an 
equivalent instruction or a block of code. To accomplish this technique, the 
metamorphic generator must maintain a dictionary of instructions and their equivalents. 
An example showing how substitution is done is illustrated in figure 3 below. 
 
                         
Figure 3. Simple Substitution  
Source:   Author’s Research 
   Original Code  
 push eax 
 push ebx 
 push ecx 
 push edx 
 push esi 
 push edi 
 push ebp 
 mov ebp, 0 
 mov eax, 1 
 CPUID 
 cmp ax, 0F20h 
 jb error 
 clc 
 mov di, ax 
 mov ecx, 02Ch 
 RDMSR 
 shr eax, 16 
 and al, 00000111b 
 movzx bx, al 
 shl bx, 1 
 mov [si], bx 
error:  pop ebp 
 pop esi 
 pop edi 
 pop edx 
 pop ecx 
 pop ebx 
 pop eax 
Obfuscated by 
Simple 
Substitution  
Code obfuscated through instruction 
substitution 
  
 xor ebp, ebp 
 xor eax, eax 
 or eax, 1 
 CPUID 
 mov bx, ax 
 cmp bx, 0F20h 
 jb error 
 lahf 
 and af, 0FEh 
 sahf 
 mov di, bx 
 mov bx, 02ch 
 movzx ecx, bx 
 RDMSR 
 rol eax, 16 
 and al, 00000111b 
 xor bx, bx 
 mov bl, al 
 shl bx, 1 
 mov [si], bx 
error:  popad 
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2.1.2 Instruction Reordering  
Reordering instructions and inserting unconditional branches or jumps using GOTO 
statements is one way of metamorphism employed in virus body. Reordering can also 
be done by reordering the independent instructions in the same way compilers do. 
Figure 4 below illustrates an example of instruction reordering.      
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Instruction reordering  
Source:   Author’s Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Original Code  
 mov ax, 0A000h  
 mov es, ax  
 xor edi, edi  
 push 0  
 pop ds  
 mov esi, 0B000h  
 mov ecx, 64 * 1024  
 shr ecx, 02h  
 rep movsd es:[edi], ds:[esi]  
 
 
 
  Code obfuscated through instruction  
  reordering  
 mov ax, 0A000h  
 jmp s1  
      s2: jmp s3  
     s4: mov esi, 0B000h  
 jmp s5  
     s1: mov es, ax  
 xor edi, edi  
 jmp s2 
     s3: push 0 
 pop ds 
 jmp s4  
      s6: shr ecx, 02h  
 jmp s7  
      s5: mov ecx, 64 * 1024  
 jmp s6  
      s7: rep movsd  
 es:[edi], ds:[esi]  
 
 
Obfuscated by 
Instruction 
Reordering  
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2.1.3 Dead Code Insertion  
This technique inserts do-nothing or garbage instructions like NOP inside the virus 
body without altering original functionality. This is one of the easiest techniques to 
obfuscate the code section and the easiest to detect as the actual virus code is not 
rearranged. Dead code insertion is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Dead code insertion  
Source:   Author’s Research 
 
 
 
 
   Original Code  
 mov ebx, 0F5h 
 push edx 
 push eax 
 mov eax, 75h 
 mul ebx 
 inc eax 
 adc edx, 0 
 mov ebx, eax 
 mov ecx, edx 
 pop eax 
 pop edx 
 neg ebx 
 mov [esi], ebx 
 
 
Obfuscated 
by Dead 
Code 
Insertion  
  Code obfuscated through Dead Code   
Insertion  
 mov ebx, 0F5h 
 push ebx 
 add ebx, 1 
 sub ebx, 1 
 pop ebx 
 push edx 
 push eax 
 mov eax, 75h 
 rol eax, 16 
 ror eax, 16 
 mul ebx 
 inc eax 
 add esi, 0 
 adc edx, 0 
 mov ebx, eax 
 mov ecx, edx 
 push ecx 
 mov ecx, 1 
l1:  loop l1 
 pop ecx 
 pop eax 
 jmp s1 
s1:  pop edx 
 nop 
 nop 
 neg ebx 
 xchg ebx, edx 
 xchg edx, ebx 
 mov [esi], ebx 
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2.1.4 Register Usage exchange  
Register Usage Exchange is a technique which involves changing usage of registers in 
the code without modifying the flow of code. This technique often requires adding more 
instructions for resetting or restoring the state of the registers. It seems to be more 
complex compared to other techniques as it requires knowledge of processor registers 
and supported instruction sets along with the ability to parse the binary code section 
and identify the register usage. Figure 6 below illustrates register usage exchange. 
 
  
 
 
Note:  EBX replaced with ESI and EDX replaced with EDI  
 
Figure 6.  Register usage exchange 
Source:   Author’s Research 
   Original Code  
 mov ebx, 0F5h 
 push edx 
 push eax 
 mov eax, 75h 
 mul ebx 
 inc eax 
 adc edx, 0 
 mov ebx, eax 
 mov ecx, edx 
 pop eax 
 pop edx 
 neg ebx 
 mov [esi],ebx 
Code obfuscated through register 
reassignment 
 
 push esi 
 mov esi, 0F5h 
 push edi 
 push edx 
 push eax 
 mov eax, 75h 
 mul esi 
 inc eax 
 mov edi, edx 
 adc edi, 0 
 mov esi, eax 
 mov ecx, edi 
 pop eax 
 pop edx 
 pop edi 
 neg esi 
 mov ebx, esi 
 pop esi 
 mov [esi], ebx 
Obfuscated 
by 
exchanging 
registers 
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2.1.5 Reordering Subroutines  
Obviously, using this technique, metamorphic engine reorders subroutines and thus 
changes the structure of the code. The above technique is another simple technique to 
obfuscate the shape of the virus. Reordering Subroutines is illustrated in figure 7 below. 
        
Figure 7.  Reordering subroutines 
Source:   Author’s Research 
Original Code  
 count_0s_eax PROC 
  push eax 
  push edx 
  xor ebx 
  mov ecx, 32 
  i1:  shr eax, 1 
  jc i2 
  inc ebx 
 i2:  loop i1 
  pop eax 
  pop edx 
  ret 
 count_0s_eax ENDP 
 
 multiply_ebx_by_5 PROC 
  push eax 
  push edx 
  mov eax, 5 
  mul ebx 
  mov ebx, eax 
  pop edx 
  pop eax 
  ret 
 multiply_ebx_by_5 ENDP 
 
 memory_copy PROC 
  mov esi, 0A000h 
  mov edi, 0B000h 
  mov ecx, 10 * 1024 
  rep movsd es:[edi],ds:[esi] 
 memory_copy ENDP 
 
 main  PROC 
  call count_0s_eax 
  call multiply_bx_by_5 
  call memory_copy 
  ret 
 main ENDP 
 END main 
Code obfuscated through instruction  
reordering  
 memory_copy PROC 
  mov esi, 0A000h 
  mov edi, 0B000h 
  mov ecx, 10 * 1024 
  rep movsd es:[edi],ds:[esi] 
 memory_copy ENDP 
 
 count_0s_eax PROC 
  push eax 
  push edx 
  xor ebx 
  mov ecx, 32 
 i1:  shr eax, 1 
  jc i2 
  inc ebx 
 i2:  loop i1 
  pop eax 
  pop edx 
  ret 
 count_0s_eax ENDP 
 
 main PROC 
  call count_0s_eax 
  call multiply_bx_by_5 
  call memory_copy 
  ret 
 main ENDP 
 
 multiply_ebx_by_5 PROC 
  push eax 
  push edx 
  mov eax, 5 
  mul ebx 
  mov ebx, eax 
  pop edx 
  pop eax 
  ret 
 multiply_ebx_by_5 ENDP 
 
Obfuscated by 
Reordering 
Subroutines 
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2.2  Other viruses 
One of the oldest and popular viruses from the late 1980s is boot sector virus. It 
replaces Master Boot Record (MBR) or boot sector in the hard drive with its own code. 
The boot sector is a drive sector where the Operating System (OS) boot loader lives. 
The Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) transfers control to the boot sector at the end of 
Power-On Self-Test (POST) to hand off control to the OS while booting. Infecting the 
boot sector enables the boot virus to gain the ability to take over the control whenever 
the system boots, stay hidden in memory during runtime, and perform its malicious 
activities. 
One of the other popular and challenging viruses is polymorphic virus. It uses 
encryption to get away from antivirus software that only uses simple signature detection 
technique to detect viruses. Each polymorphic virus incorporates a decryptor at the top 
of an execution flow so that the virus can decrypt the encrypted part of the code at first 
and hand off the control to decrypted virus. As a polymorphic virus usually embeds the 
decryptor at the beginning of the code section, it enables anti-virus scanners to look for 
decryptor byte patterns at the beginning of a code section and detect the virus easily. 
A Macro virus is a type of virus that mainly infects documents that are normally not 
executable. It is written in a macro language that is supported by word processors and 
email applications; this provides mechanism to embed macro programs within 
documents and execute it whenever the document is opened. Modern Antivirus 
software has the capability to detect such macro viruses. 
3.  Metamorphic virus and their detection techniques 
As metamorphic viruses employ complicated techniques, many different methods have 
been developed to detect metamorphic viruses. Each detection method has its own 
pros and cons. Some of the detection techniques described in Symantec’s white paper 
(Szor, 2001) are highlighted below. 
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Geometric Detection technique relies on “shape heuristic”; this allows to find whether a 
file is infected, or not, by learning the file structure of the virus and looking for learnt 
structures in the infected files. Often, this technique is prone to false positives as it 
simply learns the layout of the virus and does not learn about the virus at the instruction 
level.  
Code emulation is employed by creating a virtual machine which emulates the 
underlying hardware including processor, memory, and peripherals and runs an 
operating system. This technique detects viruses by running suspicious files on its guest 
virtual machine and looks for any malicious activities and patterns. The above technique 
has the ability to detect complicated viruses but it needs considerable system resources 
to create a virtual machine. 
The last and most successful technique is the Machine learning technique. This 
technique uses the concept of data mining, neural networks, and HMM to learn the 
structure of the virus at the instruction level. Though, data mining techniques produce 
more false positives, neural networks and HMM have a very low rate of false positives.  
As our research is focused on using HMM for metamorphic virus detection, HMM will be 
discussed in detail in the following section.  
 
3.1  Hidden Markov Models  
The Hidden Markov Model is a state machine with a finite set of states, each of which is 
associated with a probability distribution for certain observation symbols. This model is 
called “Hidden” Markov Model because the external observer can only see the outcome 
or the observation, and the state remains hidden. Transition between states is 
associated with transition probability and an outcome, or observation is associated with 
observation probability. HMMs are statistical learning techniques by which we can train 
the model for particular observation sequence (opcode sequence from a program). After 
training a HMM with a set of opcode sequence, the model gains the ability to detect 
similar opcode sequence in a given input.  
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The notations used in HMM are listed below.  
 
T = the length of the observation sequence  
N = the number of states in the model  
M = the number of observation symbols  
Q = the states of the Markov process {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1  
V=set of possible observations {0, 1, . . . ,M −1}  
A = the state transition probabilities matrix  
B = the observation probability matrix  
π = the initial state distribution matrix  
O = (O0, O1, . . . ,OT−1) = observation sequence.  
λ= (A, B, π) is a HMM model  
 
Figure 8 below shows the Hidden Markov Model state transition where X is a hidden 
state and O is observation sequence which an observer can see.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Hidden Markov Model  
Source:   Stamp, M., 2004 
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4. Metamorphic detection with HMM  
Initially, HMM is trained with variants of same family viruses (viruses generated with 
same virus generation kit) during which HMM create a model for each family viruses. 
Once training is completed, HMM use that model to detect whether a given file belongs 
to particular family, or not. Before the training phase, a number of steps should be 
carried out. Let us examine the steps involved in Wong and Stamp’s (2006) work; first, 
different viruses are generated using virus generators; second, the generated viruses 
are assembled using TASM 5.0 to create executables; and finally, the executables are 
disassembled back into assembly code using IDA Pro. The above steps are illustrated 
in Figure 9 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Preprocessing of virus files 
Source:    Wong and Stamp (2006) 
 
 
Once disassembled, they extracted assembly opcode sequences from disassembled 
ASM files and concatenated all the opcode sequences to form a single long sequence. 
Finally, HMM was trained with the single concatenated sequence. Large collections of 
metamorphic viruses generated by virus generator kits are grouped into different data 
sets with each data set containing viruses generated by same Virus generation kit. Five 
fold cross validation is applied to a data set and further subdivided into five subsets: four 
being training sets and one being a test set; each time, a different train set and test set 
is used. Training set viruses are used for HMM training and test set viruses are used to 
test, or evaluate the performance of HMM in finding the same family virus.  
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5.  Efficient preprocessing of metamorphic virus executables  
As explained in section 4, Wong and Stamp used IDA pro, a disassembler, to 
disassemble the executables before extracting the opcode sequence for the training set. 
This disassembling step is time-consuming, inefficient, and impractical when it involves 
large numbers of virus files. An alternative method is to extract the opcode sequences 
directly from executables and use the resultant sequence to train HMM.  
Extracting opcode sequences programmatically from binary executables with no manual 
work involved is very complicated, as the binary file is raw and, in most cases, data is 
embedded within the code section. This research is focused on simplifying and 
completely removing the manual work involved in the process of creating opcode 
sequence and improving the efficiency of overall preprocessing. In our method, we 
followed three consecutive steps to preprocess a virus file. The steps involved in the 
method of preprocessing under discussion as are follows; 
1. Extracting Code section: An executable may include a number of sections 
such as code, data, and stack. As virus codes mostly lives only in code 
section, we need to extract the code section from the executable file 
discarding other sections. Though there are a lot of executable formats 
currently in use, we have taken only Portable Executable (PE) format and 
DOS executable format into consideration as these formats are most-used 
popular formats. 
2. Create opcode sequence: Analyze each virus file individually and determine 
Most Frequently Occurred (MFO) mnemonics. Find out all possible opcodes 
for MFO mnemonics and create a lookup table of MFO opcodes. The opcode 
sequence is created directly from the executable files by scanning byte by 
byte and checking if it falls into MFO opcodes by looking into the MFO 
opcode table. 
3. Concatenate opcode sequence: Finally, opcode sequences are divided into 
data set and train set. All opcode sequences of data set are concatenated to 
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form a single observation sequence. This observation sequence is used as 
train set for HMM. 
5.1 Extraction of code segments from Virus executables 
5.1.1  PE executable format  
PE executable (PE) format is a “file format for executables, object code, and DLLs, used 
in 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Windows operating systems” (Wikipedia).  I have 
focused on PE executables as it is the most used and most vulnerable format being the 
standard of windows OS. Before dealing with extraction of code segment from PE 
executables, it is essential to discuss bits and pieces of PE file format to have a good 
idea of PE executable. The subsequent sections describe PE format in detail and how 
to extract code section from PE format compliant file. The format of a PE file is shown 
figure 10 (Page 16). 
 
MS DOS header  
A PE file always starts with a MS DOS header that can be identified by a two-byte 
signature represented in ASCII as “MZ” or in hex as “0x5A4D”. Though MS-DOS header 
is comprised of many fields, e_magic and e_lfanew are the fields we are interested in.  
e_magic field contains the signature of MS DOS header and e_lfanew contains Relative 
Virtual Address (RVA) to PE header. It also includes a checksum file that can be used 
to check the integrity of the header. 
 
A MSDOS stub program is included in windows 32 and 64 bit format to display a 
message “This program cannot be run in DOS mode” when PE executables are run 
under MSDOS environment.  
 
This header was embedded in PE executables to provide backward compatibility when 
the industry was transitioning from DOS operating system to Windows operating 
system. 
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Figure 10.  PE executable format Layout  
Source:      Microsoft PE specification, 2008  
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PE header  
The MS-DOS header is followed by PE header that contains a PE signature File header 
and Optional Header. The PE signature is used to identify the PE header in a PE file 
which is  represented  by a 4-byte value in ASCII as “PE” or in hex as “0x00004550”  
Among the many fields file header contains, we are interested in two important fields. 
Those fields and their usages are explained in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.  PE file Header 
 
Source: Microsoft PE Specification, 2008 
Since optional header is not required for our purpose, the field SizeOfOptionalHeader is 
used to skip the optional header. 
  
Section Header  
Followed by the optional header is a section header that contains information about 
different sections of the file. Table 2 shows all the fields in section header. Section 
header is an array of structures where there is a structure for each section containing all 
the fields as shown in table 2 (Page 18). The name field and characteristics field are 
required to find the code section. The pointertorawdata and sizeofrawdata fields are 
used to locate and extract the code section. Table 3 (Page 20) shows section header 
characteristic flags. 
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Table 2.  PE Section Header Fields 
 
Source: Microsoft PE Specification, 2008 
 
 
Sharmidha Govindaraj                                                                                                                 Metamorphic Detection               
CS298 Report                                                                   19                                                                            Fall 2008                                           
  
 
   Table 3.  PE Section Header Characteristic Flags 
 
   Source: Microsoft PE Specification, 2008 
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Figure 11 shows the layout of PE executable in more detail with signatures, partitioned 
file, and optional header and pointers from section header entry to appropriate sections. 
 
 
Figure 11  Detailed Layout of PE executable 
Source:     Patriek, 2002 
 
5.1.2  PE Code Segment Extraction  
This section explains how our program extracts code segment from PE executables 
with reference to actual codes. Figure 12 (page 22) demonstrates a high level execution 
flow of code segment extraction. 
  
First, the DOS header is read and the e_magic field is checked for MS DOS signature 
“MZ” or “0x5A4D”. If the signature is valid, then we have to jump to PE header using the 
address in e_lfanew field. Once the PE header is read from the file, the signature field is 
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checked for PE signature “PE” or “0x00004550”. If the signature is valid, the file being 
processed is confirmed as a PE executable file. Once PE header is located and 
validated, the SizeOfOptionalHeader field is used to skip the optional header since 
optional header is not required for our purpose. Now we have reached the section 
header.  
 
The section header is an array of structures where there is a structure for each section 
in the file. So, to find the section header for code section, we have to compare the name 
field to “.text” or characteristics field to “0x0000020”. As the name field is not 
standardized, it is not named always “.text” and so we are checking for characteristics 
field too. According to characteristics flags, “0x0000020” mean that the section contains 
executable code. So, once the code section header is located, the field called 
PointerToRawData is used to locate the code section, and the field called 
SizeOfRawData is used to extract the code section.  
 
After completing the code segment extraction, the program is tested with different input 
exe files. All the tested files differ in size or number of code sections. Further testing is 
conducted by using HexEdit and PEdump utilities, a dumping utility for executables. The 
same exe files, which were used for testing our program is given as input to both of 
these utilities. The output of our program is binary compared with utility outputs. 
Comparison showed that our code worked flawlessly and extracted code segments 
exactly. 
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     Begin 
e_magic=”MZ” 
 
MS DOS header found Not a valid PE file 
Jump to RVA in      
e_lfanew field 
Not a valid PE file PE header found & 
file validated 
skip optional header for 
“SizeOfOptionalHeader” bytes 
characteristics= 
“0x0000020” 
Jump to RVA in “PointertoRaw” 
data field 
Extract code section upto 
“SizeOfRawData” bytes 
End 
End 
Code section not found 
End 
End 
yes 
yes 
yes 
No 
No 
No 
Figure 12.  PE Code section extraction flow 
Source:      Author’s Research 
Signature = 
“0x00004550” 
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5.1.3  DOS executable Format 
Although DOS executables seem to be outdated, many early viruses, like G2 and 
MPCGEN, are yet in the DOS executable form. MS DOS header in DOS executables is 
exactly the same as in PE executables. For our purpose, we are required to read 
following fields: e_magic, e_cblp, e_cp and e_ip. e_magic field contains the signature 
represented in ASCII as “MZ” or in hex as “0x54AD”. This field is validated to check 
whether the given file is a valid DOS file. If DOS executable signature is found, e_cp, 
e_ip and e_cblp field are read from the header. e_ip field specify the offset where code 
segment starts. e_cp field specify number of pages in the file where each page is 512 
bytes long. e_cblp field specify number of bytes used in the last page of code segment.  
 
Once we get the values of all the above fields, size of the code segment is calculated as 
follows, 
 
  Size of code segment = e_cp*512 - (512 - e_cblp) 
 
Once size of code segment is calculated, extract the code section starting from the 
offset pointed by e_ip. 
5.2  Preprocessing of Code Segment and Opcode extraction  
As discussed earlier, Wong and Stamp used IDApro, a disassembler, to create 
disassembled ASM files and extract assembly opcode sequences from executable files.  
One of the goals for this project is to eliminate time-consuming and inefficient 
disassembling process. 
 
With the code section of virus executables in hand, we started researching for methods 
which doesn’t go through disassembling to extract assembly opcodes like MOV, ADD 
and so on. We found two obvious alternatives. First method is Most Frequently 
Occurred (MFO) opcode searching method which looks for the MFO opcodes in the 
binary executable and creates the opcode sequence of MFO opcodes. Second method 
is adding a part of disassembling code which disassembles on the fly with no manual 
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intervention and extracting only the opcodes leaving behind operands. Of these two 
alternatives, we selected the former approach because latter involves disassembling 
and our major goal is to skip disassembling. 
5.2.1  Intel x86 Instruction Set 
A brief introduction to Intel x86 instruction set is required to understand low level details 
of assembly instruction. Figure 13 shows Intel instruction format. 
 
Each instruction consists of instruction prefixes, instruction opcode bytes, MOD value, 
address displacement value and an immediate data. The format of an Intel x86 
processor architecture based instruction is shown in the figure 13 below. The assembly 
language commands corresponding to opcodes are called mnemonics. For example, 
the assembly language command ADD is a mnemonic corresponding to the opcode 
0x80. 
 
         
 
 
Figure 13.  Intel instruction format 
Source:      Intel Programmer’s Manual 
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The purpose of different fields of an instruction set is described below. 
 
1. Instruction prefixes are used as modifiers to the main command. Prefixes can be 
used to repeat string operations, to provide segment overrides, and to change 
operand and address sizes. 
2. An opcode is a one or more bytes long binary representation of assembly 
language mnemonic. While assembling, the assembler translates mnemonics to 
corresponding codes. 
3. Mod field allows specifying which of the general purpose registers or addressing 
modes are used in an instruction. 
4. Displacement field is used to provide a displacement value to an address 
referred in an instruction. For example, an ADD instruction with a reference to an 
address displaced by an offset 4056 can be represented as “ADD ax, [bp+di] + 
4056”. The displacement can be 1, 2, or 4 bytes long. 
5. An immediate operand is a constant, used as an operand in an instruction, which 
can be a 1, 2, or 4 bytes value. In an instruction, “ADD ax, 10”, immediate 
operand is 10. 
 
Some of the basic properties of such instruction are as follows: 
• The length of an assembled instruction varies based on number of fields and 
size of each field used in an instruction.  
• A single mnemonic may be translated into different opcodes based on the 
type of operands used. 
• The Mod field varies based on operand used. 
• An operand can be a register, immediate, direct or indirect memory reference 
with or without displacement. 
• Some fields are optional. 
 
There are three types of registers: 8-bit, 16-bit and 32-bit registers represented as r8, 
r16 and r32. Table 4 below shows registers available in each type. 
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Table 4. Registers and corresponding register encodings 
Register 
Encodings 
r8 r16 r32 
0      AL       AX      EAX 
1      CL      CX      ECX 
2      DL      DX      EDX 
3      BL      BX      EBX 
4      AH      SP      ESP 
5      CH      BP      EBP 
6      DH      SI      ESI 
7      BH      DI      EDI 
Source: Intel’s Programming Manual 
 
5.2.2  Preprocessing of executable code segment 
Since there are more than 100 instructions in Intel x86 instruction set, rather than 
working on all those instructions, it is inevitable to take only the Most Frequently 
Occurred (MFO) instructions into account for three important reasons:  
 
1.  It is time-consuming to collect binary opcodes covering the whole instruction 
set to form opcode table.   
2. The opcode table should be as small as possible to achieve better efficiency. 
3. Training HMM with small set of MFO instruction opcodes allows HMM to find 
patterns or features of virus effectively 
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As per Billar, only fourteen instructions in entire Intel instruction set are MFO 
instructions. Those instructions are ADD, AND, CALL, CMP, JMP, JNZ, JZ, LEA, MOV, 
PUSH, POP, RETN, TEST and XOR.  After a careful analysis, we found that using MFO 
instructions enables HMM to learn some patterns in the virus code and detect viruses 
more effectively. Figure 14 and 15 below shows the percentage of occurrence of 14 
MFO opcodes in normal and malicious files respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Frequency of Occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in normal files (in percentage) 
Source:      Billar 
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Figure 15.  Frequency of Occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in Malwares (in percentage) 
Source:      Billar 
 
As demonstrated in figures 14 and 15, approximately 90% of total instructions used are 
14 MFO instructions. 
 
Billar et al. has also discussed the percentage of occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in 
different categories of malwares like Viruses, Worms, Trojans and Bots. Table 5 (page 
27) shows the frequency of occurrence in percentage. 
 
As the key idea in our approach is to search for a binary instruction opcode in the code 
segment, there are possibilities for false predictions. For instance, when we search for a 
1-byte binary opcode, it may potentially hit many operands with same byte value 
resulting in false positives. In this context, false positive occurs when an operand or a 
part of an irrelevant opcode is detected as an opcode in examination. For example, one 
of the opcodes for JMP is 0xEB and one of the opcodes for SUB is 0xEB83. When an 
operand 0xEB or the part of SUB opcode is detected as JMP, it is considered as a false 
positive prediction.  
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Table 5.  Frequency of Occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in different malwares 
Opcode Goodware Bot Trojan Virus Worm 
MOV 25.3% 34.6% 30.5% 16.1% 22.2% 
PUSH 19.5% 14.1% 15.4% 22.7% 20.7% 
CALL 8.7% 11.0% 10.0% 9.1% 8.7% 
POP 6.3% 6.8% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2% 
CMP 5.1% 3.6% 3.6% 5.9% 5.0% 
JZ 4.3% 3.3% 3.5% 4.4% 4.0% 
LEA 3.9% 2.6% 2.7% 5.5% 4.2% 
TEST 3.2% 2.6% 3.4% 3.1% 3.0% 
JMP 3.0% 3.0% 3.4% 2.7% 4.5% 
ADD 3.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 3.0% 
JNZ 2.6% 2.2% 2.6% 3.2% 3.2% 
RETN 2.2% 3.0% 3.2% 2.0% 2.3% 
XOR 1.9% 3.2% 2.7% 2.1% 2.3% 
AND        1.35% 0.5% 0.6% 1.5% 1.6% 
 
Source: Billar 
 
As discussed earlier in Intel x86 instruction set, the length of an opcode varies based on 
number of operands, types of registers and types of memory access used in an 
instruction. It may be 1, 2, or more bytes in length. As it will be time consuming to 
search for longer opcodes, after a careful analysis, it has been found that MFO 
instructions are mostly 1 or 2 bytes long. Further, we discovered that more the number 
of 2-byte opcodes used to identify MFO opcodes, better the accuracy. Due to the fact 
that the probability for an operand or data to have the same value as the two-byte 
opcode is less, we have tried to extend 1-byte opcodes to 2-byte opcodes. The 1-byte 
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opcode that can not be converted into 2-byte opcode should be located based on some 
conditions rather than looking for it indiscriminately.  We used a utility called Debug32 to 
find 2-byte alternatives for 1-byte opcode. Figure 16 below illustrates how 1-byte 
opcode is converted into 2-byte opcodes based on the type of registers used in the ADD 
instruction. 
 
                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.   Convert 1-byte opcode to 2-byte opcode for ADD r8/m8, imm8 
Source:       Author’s Research 
 
 
1-byte opcode for 
ADD r8/m8, imm8 
(0x80) 
Operand 
DL (0xC0) 
Operand 
CL (0xC1) 
Operand 
BL (0xC2) 
Operand 
AH (0xC3) 
Operand 
DH (0xC4) 
Operand 
CH (0xC5) 
Operand 
BH (0xC6) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC080) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC180) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC280) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC380) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC480) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC580) 
2-byte opcode 
(0xC680) 
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As figure 16 illustrates, in the instruction “ADD r8/m8, imm8”, ADD refers to actual 
instruction or mnemonic, r8 refers to 8-bit register, m8 refers to 8-bit memory location 
and imm8 refers to 8-bit constant. The register references in this instruction can be 
substituted with any of the seven 8-bit registers (DL, CL, BL, AH, DH, CH, BH) to extend 
1-byte opcode (0x80) into 2-byte opcodes.        
 
After careful analysis of virus source files, we decided to collect all possible opcodes for 
register and direct memory addressing instructions and only MFO opcodes for indexed 
addressing instructions. Since including all the indexing instructions in the opcode table 
introduces all possible byte values from 0x00 to 0xFF in the second byte of the opcode, 
the probability of catching false positives is high. For example, binary opcode for 
instruction “ADD r8/m8, r8” is 0x02. In general, 1-byte opcode 0x02 can be extended to 
2-byte based on type of register or memory addressing used. If we have to include all 
the indexing instructions for ADD, opcode table will require having all values from 
0x0200 to 0x02FF. With the second byte position having a possibility of any value 
between 00 to FF, any operand or sub-opcode with value 0x02 will be detected as ADD 
regardless of the second byte. 
 
Though effort has been made to change every 1-byte opcode to 2-byte, there are 
instructions whose opcodes cannot be extended. In most cases, the instructions with 
AL/AX/EAX as the first operand and imm8 as the second operand have 1-byte opcode. 
There is no way to extend these 1-byte opcodes to 2-byte.For example, binary opcode 
for instruction “ADD AL, imm8” is 0x04 which is an instruction referring the register AL 
directly. There are totally 60 such 1-byte opcodes for 14 MFO instructions of which 35 
MFO opcodes are included in the collection. The 35 opcodes collected are the 1-byte 
opcodes of CMP, CALL, JMP, JNZ, JZ, POP and PUSH. The 1-byte opcodes for 
remaining instructions are neglected to avoid False Positives (FP).Finally, we 
maintained two sets of opcode list: 1-byte opcode list and two-byte opcode list.  
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A high level flow involved in detecting MFO opcodes are shown in Figure 15 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Flow Diagram for MFO Opcode Detection 
Source:     Author’s Research 
Read 2-bytes from virus file 
Is 2-byte 
opcode found 
Read 2-bytes from virus file Translate 2-byte opcode into 
mnemonic and write to opcode 
sequence file 
Is 1-byte 
opcode 
found? 
Translate 1-byte opcode into 
mnemonic and write to opcode 
sequence file 
No yes 
No 
yes 
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Since most of the 1-byte instructions are PUSH and POP, we may end up catching 
False Positives (FP) for these instructions. So, we checked for certain conditions while 
detecting PUSH instructions based on the MFO pattern found in the virus assembly 
files. The pattern found for PUSH instruction is that PUSH is always followed by another 
PUSH or POP instruction. So, whenever 1-byte PUSH opcode is detected, the 
subsequent byte is checked for PUSH or POP. If the subsequent byte is detected as 
PUSH or POP, both of the bytes are added to observation sequence. Otherwise, both 
bytes are skipped. 
 
In addition to PUSH and POP, we added conditions to detect 1-byte JMP. We noticed 
more FP for JMP because whenever our algorithm comes across 2-byte SUB, it is 
detected as JMP because both instructions are sharing a common opcode. In this case, 
let us consider the 1-byte opcodes 0xEB and 0xE9 for JMP and two-byte opcodes 
0xEB83 and 0xE983 for SUB. As you notice here, both of the instructions are sharing 
the same opcode 0xEB and 0xE9. To avoid such false positives, whenever we 
encounter 0xEB and 0xE9, the consecutive byte is checked for 0x83. If the consecutive 
byte is detected as 0x83, both of the bytes are skipped. Otherwise, 1-byte 0xEB or 0xE9 
is written as JMP in the observation sequence. 
 
Using our algorithm, the generated opcode sequence for each virus file was 95% 
accurate with 5% being FP. It means that 20 out of 450 opcodes in the opcode 
sequence are FP. 
5.3  Creating Opcode sequence 
To create opcode sequences, an input set is formed with executables of virus. Input set 
is divided into three sets consisting of family viruses, non-family viruses and normal 
files. The virus generated by a same generator belongs to the same family and is 
referred as family virus. In contrast, virus generated by different generator belongs to 
different family and is referred as non-family virus. Family viruses are named as 
“NGVCKexes” consisting of 200 metamorphic virus variants generated by Next 
Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK) generator. Non- Family viruses are named as 
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“OtherExes” consisting of 25 virus generated by Second Generation virus Generator 
(G2) and Mass Code Generator (MPCGEN). It includes 
 
• 15 virus variants generated by Second Generation virus generator (G2) 
version 0.70a released in January 1993 representing non-family virus 
• 10 virus variants generated by Mass Code Generator (MPCGEN) version 1.0 
released in 1993 representing non family virus 
 
The normal files are 40 random utility executables collected from Cygwin DLL (version 
1.5.25). 
 
Wong and Stamp collected 10 G2, 10 VCL32 and 5 MPCGEN as non-family virus. 
VCL32 generated files has some properties that doesn’t allow us to include it as input 
set for our program. VCL32 generated files have all the function definitions inside data 
sections and only function calls in code section. Due to the reason that code section is 
same in all VCL32 virus executables and our program extracts only the code section to 
extract opcode sequences, we have not considered VCL32 files.  
 
Once an input set is created, it is given as input to “create_obs.exe” program where 
“Obs” stands for observation sequence or opcode sequence. The output of this program 
is the data set and the compare set. A data set of 200 individual files each consisting of 
corresponding opcode sequence is created and a compare set of 65 individual non-
family viruses and normal files consisting of corresponding opcode sequence is created. 
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5.4  Training and Testing HMM 
Training and testing followed the same methodology of (Wong, 2006).  Five-fold cross 
validation is applied to the data set and divided into train set and test set. So, train set 
consists of 160 virus opcode sequence (four subsets each with 40 viruses) and test set 
(one subset) consists of 40 virus opcode sequence. Each time, a different test set is 
selected and other four subsets are used as train set. This process is repeated five 
times.  The length of each train file in data set ranges from 395 to 445 with an average 
of 420. So, the typical length of concatenated 160 opcode sequence is in the range of 
65,450 to 65,650 with an average of 65,550.   
 
Once HMM is trained with the concatenated opcode sequence, a model is created for 
every train set.  After training, the test set and compare set is scored with corresponding 
trained model. For each file in test set and compare set, Log Likelihood Per Opcode 
(LLPO) is calculated as its score. For further details about LLPO, refer (Wong, 2006). A 
threshold value is also calculated which is an average of minimum LLPO in data set and 
maximum LLPO in compare set. The files with scores above (greater than) the 
threshold are classified as virus and files with scores below (less than) the threshold are 
classified as non- virus or non member. Training and classifying is explained in figure 
18. The steps followed in training and classifying are 
 
1. Train HMM with train set consisting of 160 opcode sequence files 
2. Score and calculate LLPO for files in test set and compare set 
3. Determine threshold value to classify member virus and non-members 
4. Continue step 1 until all test sets are scored 
 
These steps are diagrammatically shown in figure 18 (page 36). 
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Figure 18.  Training and classifying process 
Source:      Wong, 2006 
 
6. Experiment Setup and Results 
 
Section 6.1 describes the input data, platform setup and programming languages used 
in the experiment. Section 6.2 provides the results obtained using our method which 
eliminates disassembling and works on 14 MFO opcodes. Section 6.3 provides the 
results obtained using Wong’s method which uses disassembling and works on all 
opcodes in Intel instruction set. In the final section, we compare results of our method 
with results of Wong’s method to test the accuracy and efficiency of our method. 
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6.1  Experiment Setup 
As discussed earlier, input set consists of three set of executables. First set consists of 
200 NGVCK executables named as N0 to N199 (N stands for NGVCK), second set 
consists of 15 G2 executables named as G2T0 to G2T14 and 10 MPCGEN executables 
named as MPC0 to MPC9, and third set consists of 40 Cygwin executables named as 
CYG0 to CYG39.  
Extracted code section from each virus executable is collected in ICS (Individual Code 
Section) Data Set and named as cs_n0 to cs_n199.  
Data set consists of 200 NGVCK opcode sequence files named as OBSN0 to OBSN199 
(OBS stands for observation sequence and N stands for NGVCK). Compare set 
consists of 40 Cygwin opcode sequence files named as OBSC0 to OBSC39 (C stands 
for Cygwin) and 25 non-family virus opcode sequence files named as OBSV0 to 
OBSV24 (V stands for other virus). 
 
TrainFile consists of 10 files, 5 being “alphabet” file consisting of distinct opcodes in 
each train set and 5 being “in” (in stands for input) file consisting of concatenated 160 
opcode sequence in test set. Each alphabet and input file is named 160_OBSN_E0 to 
160_OBSN_E4. In the file name, 160 stands for number of opcode sequences being 
concatenated, OBS stands for observation sequence, N stands for NGVCK and E0 
stands for excluded set 0 which is the test set. 
 
With number of states N being different each time ranging from 2 to 6, let us see how 
models are named. There are 25 models created by HMM with 5 being created for each 
state N.  If a model is named as 160_OBSN_N2_E0, then 
• 160 is the number of files in train set 
• OBSN stands for NGVCK observation sequence 
• N2 stands for number of states as 2 
• E0 stands for test set 0 
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Table 6 below shows the experiment platform and programming languages used. 
 
Table 6. Experiment Setup 
Platform Windows XP 
Virus Generators NGVCK, G2 and MPCGEN 
Programming Languages C, Ruby 
Assembler & Linker TASM, TASM32, TLINK, TLINK32, MSVC 6.0, 
Ruby 
Utilities  HexDump, Debug32 
Source: Author’s Research 
  
 
6.2  Experiment Results I 
With N ranging from 2 to 6, and test sets ranging from 0 to 4, 25 models were created 
with HMM. 
Let us examine how the HMM separated family viruses from compare set files. All 25 
models made a clear separation of scores between family viruses and compare set 
files. Each model scored a data set consisting of 40 family viruses and compare set 
consisting of 40 normal files and 25 non-family viruses. Table 7 shows LLPO scores of 
40 family viruses and 40 normal files. The scores show that LLPO scores of family 
viruses are -1.9 or greater and LLPO scores of normal files are -2.1 or lower. 
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Table 7.  LLPO scores of 40 family viruses and 40 normal files (compare set) using model 
160_0BS_N2_E0. 
               NGVCK  Family  Viruses                                              Normal cygwin files 
 Virus 
Name 
          
LLPO 
 Virus 
Name 
          
LLPO 
 File 
Name 
          
LLPO 
 File 
Name 
          
LLPO 
OBSN0 
      
OBSN1 
      
OBSN2 
      
OBSN3 
      
OBSN4 
      
OBSN5  
      
OBSN6 
      
OBSN7 
      
OBSN8 
      
OBSN9 
      
OBSN10 
      
OBSN11 
      
OBSN12 
      
OBSN13 
      
OBSN14 
      
OBSN15 
      
OBSN16 
      
OBSN17 
      
OBSN18 
     
OBSN19 
-1.91341 
-1.91630 
-1.94792 
-1.78941 
-1.81915 
-1.88139 
-1.89580 
-1.85012 
-1.86159 
-1.91538 
-1.83419 
-1.78523 
-1.88537 
-1.82211 
-1.90262 
-1.91341 
-1.87386 
-1.81544 
-1.91167 
-1.90808 
OBSN20 
      
OBSN21 
      
OBSN22 
      
OBSN23 
      
OBSN24 
      
OBSN25  
      
OBSN26 
      
OBSN27 
      
OBSN28 
      
OBSN29 
 
OBSN30 
 
OBSN31 
 
OBSN32 
 
OBSN33 
 
OBSN34 
 
OBSN35 
 
OBSN36 
 
OBSN37 
 
OBSN38 
 
OBSN39 
     
 
-1.85286 
-1.85252 
-1.87886 
-1.94889 
-1.91749 
-1.84351 
-1.82954 
-1.87690 
-1.85007 
-1.89606 
-1.93708 
-1.87644 
-1.80577 
-1.84254 
-1.86094 
-1.92944 
-1.90475 
-1.82279 
-1.86641 
-1.89339 
    OBSV0 
    OBSV1 
    OBSV2 
    OBSV3 
    OBSV4 
    OBSV5  
    OBSV6 
    OBSV7 
    OBSV8 
    OBSV9 
    OBSV10 
    OBSV11 
    OBSV12 
    OBSV13 
    OBSV14 
    OBSV15 
    OBSV16 
    OBSV17 
    OBSV18 
    OBSV19 
      
 
-2.15787 
 
-2.10833 
 
-2.48227 
 
-2.49157 
 
-2.39297 
 
-2.53091 
 
-2.75892 
 
-2.75575 
 
-2.48225 
 
-2.46713 
 
-2.48225 
 
-2.46713 
 
-2.37040 
 
-2.71943 
 
-2.71957 
 
-2.49580 
 
-2.51546 
 
-2.39297 
 
-2.71439 
 
-2.44965 
OBSV20 
OBSV21 
OBSV22 
OBSV23 
OBSV24      
OBSV25      
OBSV26 
OBSV27 
OBSV28 
OBSV29 
OBSV30 
OBSV31 
OBSV32 
OBSV34     
OBSV34 
OBSV35 
OBSV36      
OBSV37 
OBSV38 
OBSV39 
 
-2.52410 
 
-2.58423 
 
-2.42321 
 
-2.44344 
 
-2.51328 
 
-2.63752 
 
-2.21347 
 
-2.46925 
 
-2.54372 
 
-2.46418 
 
-2.50300 
 
-2.85430 
 
-2.47473 
 
-2.24818 
 
-2.49244 
 
-2.49583 
 
-2.69585 
 
-2.49893 
 
-2.53286 
 
-2.56675 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 19 below shows the scores of test set 1 and scores of compare set files for 
model with three states; i.e., N=3 . There is a clear distinction of scores between family 
and non-family viruses. Two of the normal files have scores closer to family virus scores 
but doesn’t interleave the family virus scores.  
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Figure 19.  Log Likelihood per Opcode (LLPO) of family viruses, non-family viruses and normal 
files  
Source:      Author’s Research 
 
 
The score results shown in the above diagram is the typical range of scores we 
obtained for all models. Refer Appendix B to view the graphs for all states.  The overall 
results show that HMM is able to separate the family viruses from normal files and non-
family viruses regardless of number of states. 
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To classify a file as family virus or non-member, we need to determine a cutoff or 
threshold value. The files which are scored greater than threshold are considered as 
family viruses and those which are scored lower than threshold is considered as non-
members. Threshold is calculated as the average of minimum score of family virus and 
maximum score of non member files. 
 
    Threshold = (MinDataLog + MaxCompareLog)/2 
where 
 MinDataLog is the minimum score of family virus 
 MaxCompareLog is the maximum score of non member files 
 
If score of a family virus is lower than threshold, it results in False Negative (FN) 
prediction because a family virus is classified as non-member file. In other hand, if score 
of a non-member file is greater than threshold, it results in False Positive (FP) prediction 
because a non-member file is classified as family virus. 
 
Table 8 shows the minimum score of NGVCK family viruses, maximum score of non-
member files and corresponding threshold assigned by each model. There are 25 
different scores corresponding to 25 models. Two greatest and lowest thresholds are 
marked bold in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Minimum score of NGVCK family viruses, maximum score of non-member files and 
threshold assigned by model 
Test Set Min score of family 
viruses 
Max score of non 
member files 
Threshold 
                          N = 2 
                          N = 3 
  Test Set 0        N = 4 
                          N = 5 
                          N = 6                     
-1.9488 
-1.8745 
-1.8633 
-1.8230 
-1.7994 
-2.1083 
-2.1342 
-2.0813 
-2.0417 
-2.0841 
-2.0286 
-2.0044 
-1.9723 
-1.9323 
-1.9448 
                          N = 2 
                          N = 3 
  Test Set 1        N = 4 
                          N = 5 
                          N = 6                    
-1.9252 
-1.8896 
-1.9810 
-1.9438 
-1.9645 
-2.1490 
-2.1400 
-2.1048 
-2.1413 
-2.1667 
-2.0957 
-2.0710 
-2.0429 
-2.0426 
-2.0510 
                          N = 2 
                          N = 3 
  Test Set 2        N = 4 
                          N = 5 
                          N = 6  
-1.9381 
-1.8905 
-1.8632 
-1.8381 
-1.8158 
-2.1456 
-2.1396 
-2.1055 
-2.1418 
-2.1345 
-2.0438 
-2.0151 
-1.9843 
-1.9900 
-1.9752 
                          N = 2 
                          N = 3 
  Test Set 3        N = 4 
                          N = 5 
                          N = 6  
-1.9289 
-1.8661 
-1.8496 
-1.8311 
-1.8158 
-2.1429 
-2.1337 
-2.0998 
-2.1361 
-2.1411 
-2.0359 
-1.9999 
-1.9747 
-1.9836 
-1.9785 
                          N = 2 
                          N = 3 
  Test Set 4        N = 4 
                          N = 5 
                          N = 6  
-2.0463 
-1.9836 
-1.9500 
-1.9185 
-1.9368 
-2.1441 
-2.1357 
-2.1000 
-2.1362 
-2.1457 
-2.0952 
-2.0596 
-2.0250 
-2.0274 
-2.0413 
Source: Author’s Research 
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A single threshold should be determined from the 25 thresholds assigned by the model. 
The determined threshold will act as a cutoff point for all the model scores. If the 
determined threshold is too small, FP rate will be increased. If the determined threshold 
is too large, FN rate will be increased. The final threshold which is greater than all non-
member files and lower than all family viruses will avoid more FP and FN.  We 
experimented with four different threshold values. The corresponding false prediction 
rate can be viewed in Table 9 (page 50). The thresholds used for the experiment are   
-1.93, -1.94, -2.07, -2.09. When the threshold is as large as -1.93, there are 15 FN. So, 
only 25 of 40 family viruses are classified as family viruses and remaining 15 is 
classified as normal file. Of the four thresholds used, only -2.09 and -2.07 results in 
detection rate greater than 95%. -2.07 is considered as final threshold because the 
number of false prediction is as low as 2 when compared to 4 for -2.09. The above false 
prediction is FP resulting in classification of 2 non-member files as family viruses. Since 
there are no FN when threshold is set to -2.07, detection rate is determined as 1.0000 
where  
   Detection Rate = TP / #FV 
where  
 TP - True Positives which means number of family viruses classified as   family 
viruses 
 #FV - Total number of family viruses 
In the above case where threshold is -2.07, all 40 family viruses are classified as family 
viruses. So the detection rate is 1.000. 
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Table 9. Thresholds and False Predictions 
Test Set -1.93 -1.94 -2.07 -2.09 
 FP FN Detect  
Rate 
FP FN Detect  
Rate 
FP FN Detect 
Rate 
FP FN Detect 
Rate 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 2       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4                                         
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0
0.925 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.95 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 3       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4                    
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1
0.975 
0.975 
0.975 
0.975 
0.975 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0.975 
0.975 
0.975 
1.000 
0.975 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 4       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4                    
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 5       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4                    
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0
0.95 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 6       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4                    
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1
0.925 
1.000 
0.975 
1.000 
0.975 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0.975 
1.000 
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
Source: Author’s Research 
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Now, let us examine the training time of HMM to train each model. By default, HMM is 
trained  for 800 iterations. The running time of each iteration depends on number of 
states N and length of observation sequence T. In our experiment, value of N ranges 
from 2 to 6 and average observation sequence length is 65,450. The training time of 
HMM ranges from 31 seconds for N =2 to 18 minutes for N = 6. Figure 20 below shows 
the training time taken in seconds to create models with N ranging from 2 to 6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Training time of 25 models for 800 iterations 
Source:     Author’s Research 
 
 
Eventually, the trained model creates A, B and Pi matrices where A matrix is the state 
transition probability, B matrix is the observation probability and Pi is the initial state 
distribution. To examine the features of a virus, HMM observes the observation 
sequence and plot the values in the B matrix. So, after a model is trained, HMM assigns 
probability of occurrence of each opcode in particular state which can be viewed in B 
matrix.  Table 10 (page 52) shows transpose of B matrix for 2 states and test set 2.  
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Table 10. Transposed B matrix for N = 2 and Test set 2 
Opcode State 0                               State 1 
 
 
 
Call 
add 
cmp 
jz 
lea 
mov 
xor 
jnz 
jmp 
pop 
push 
retn 
and 
test 
0.04139156206336                    0.10697308319445 
0.03274170541118                    0.19756946116809 
0.00712020350956                    0.0329235076862 
0                                              0.0329235076852 
0.03349106402365                    0.02797364747966 
0.7834975094335                    0.19927252251573 
0                                                 0.02828160382626 
0                                                 0.04193156798704 
0                                                 0.05445961728529 
0                                                 0.03281600972899 
0.06910259796872                    0.11012487167077 
0.03265535759005                    0.06104544906463 
0                                                 0.01339285867145 
0                                                 0.0169689229576 
Source: Author’s Research 
 
In table 10 above, any state with zero value means that the corresponding opcode 
doesn’t belong to that state. For example, opcode jz has zero value in state 0 and non-
zero value in state 1 which implies that jz occurs only in state 1. 
 
In figure 21, the above table is plotted. The graph shows that opcode MOV occurs 
mostly in state 0. Opcodes XOR, POP, AND, TEST, JZ, JNZ and JMP occur only in 
state 1 and have zero probability in state 0. Rest of the opcodes occurs in both states.  
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Figure 21.  Probability distribution of observation symbols in each state for N = 2 and test set 2 
Source:      Author’s Research 
 
6.3  Experiment Results II from Wong’s method 
As discussed earlier, Wong’s method require disassembled executables as input. First, 
all input executables should be disassembled. Using IdaPro, we disassembled the 
same set of input files (200 NGVCK, 40 Cygwin, 15 G2 and 10 MPCGEN executable 
files) used in our method and created respective asm files. We used the generated asm 
files as input to the HMM. The typical observation sequence length of concatenated 
opcode sequence ranges from 91,830 to 92,430 with an average of 92,130. 
 
With N ranging from 2 to 6, and test sets ranging from 0 to 4, 25 models were created 
with HMM. Let us examine how the HMM separated family viruses from compare set 
files. All 25 models made a clear separation of scores between family viruses and 
compare set files. Each model scored a data set consisting of 40 family viruses and 
compare set consisting of 40 normal files and 25 non-family viruses. 
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Figure 22 shows the scores of test set 1 and scores of compare set files for model with 
three states; i.e., N=3 . There is no clear distinction and some interleaving of scores 
between family viruses and normal files. About three scores of normal files are 
interleaving with scores of family viruses. 
Figure 22.  Log Likelihood per Opcode (LLPO) of family viruses, non-family viruses and normal    
files  
Source:     Author’s Research 
  
HMM is not able to determine a well defined threshold for any of the models, since the 
maximum score of compare set is lesser than the minimum score of data set. For 
example, for the model with N=3 and test set 1, the minimum score of data set is -5.9 
and the maximum score of compare set is -3.0. Since, -5.9 is lesser than -3.0, it is not 
able to find threshold. Also, due to the fact that all the models have interleaving scores, 
HMM doesn’t find well defined threshold. So, after analyzing all the scores and keeping 
the detection rate greater than 95%, we determine -5.4 as the threshold. With -5.4 as 
threshold, there are 39 FP predictions and 7 FN predictions. Table 11 shows the FP and 
FN for each model. 
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Table 11. False Predictions for threshold = -5.4 
Model -5.4 
 FP FN Detection Rate 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 2       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 3       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4                    
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1.000 
0.975 
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 4       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 5       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1.000 
0.975 
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
                  Test Set 0 
                  Test Set 1       
  N = 6       Test Set 2 
                  Test Set 3 
                  Test Set 4 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
0.975 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
Source: Author’s Research 
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The diagrammatic representation of table 11 can be viewed in figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23.  Number of false predictions at each state N 
Source:      Author’s Research 
 
Now, let us examine the training time of HMM to train each model. In default, HMM is 
trained iteratively for 800 iterations. The run time of each iteration depends on number 
of states N and length of observation sequence T. In our experiment, value of N ranges 
from 2 to 6 and average observation sequence length is 92,130. The training time of 
HMM ranges from 5 mins for N =2 to 48 minutes For N = 6. Figure 23 shows the training 
time taken in seconds to create models with N ranging from 2 to 6. 
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 Figure 24.  Training time of 25 models for 800 iterations 
 Source:      Author’s Research 
 
 
6.4  Comparison of our method with Wong’s Method 
To determine the efficiency and accuracy of our method, our results are compared with 
Wong’s method. The observation sequence length and training time are compared in 
figures 24 and 25 (page 58) respectively. The comparison shows that our method 
produces smaller opcode sequence since we extracted only 14 MFO opcodes which 
eventually results in lesser training time. Using our method, the training time is reduced 
by 60%. So, our method shows significant improvement in efficiency.  
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Figure 25.  Comparison of opcode sequence length T in both methods 
Source:      Author’s Research 
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Figure 26.  Comparison of HMM training time in both methods 
Source:      Author’s Research 
 
 
The total HMM training time is on average 4.5 hours for our method and 14.5 hours for 
Wong’s method. Also, our program detects opcodes in the executables in less than 5 
Sharmidha Govindaraj                                                                                                                 Metamorphic Detection               
CS298 Report                                                                   53                                                                            Fall 2008                                           
  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5
Number of States
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
Fa
ls
e
 N
e
ga
ti
ve
 p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
Wong's Method
Our Method
minutes in comparison to IDApro disassembling which takes on average 1.5 hours for 
same set of files. For the entire experiment, our method took only 4.5 hours compared 
to 16 hours for Wong’s method. In summary, the overall performance is improved by 
70% with our method when compared to Wong’s method.  
 
In addition to performance, there is a clear distinction of scores between family viruses 
and non-members in our method. With threshold set at -2.07, there are only 2 FP 
predictions and no FN predictions resulting in 100% detection rate. In Wong’s method, 
there is some interleaving of scores between family viruses and normal files. With 
threshold set at -5.4, there are 39 FP predictions and 7 FN predictions resulting in 97% 
detection rate. This shows that accuracy is significantly improved in our method when 
compared to Wong’s method. Figure 27 shows the number of false predictions in our 
method and Wong’s method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Comparison of False Negative Prediction 
Source:  Author’s research 
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7. Conclusion   
Our method extracts code section from the virus binary files, detects MFO instruction 
opcodes, forms opcode sequence, trains HMM, and scores test files. After careful 
analysis of the virus files, 14 MFO instructions were identified (Billar) and corresponding 
opcodes are collected to produce opcode table. The produced opcode table was used 
in the process of forming opcode sequence. As the table is precise and concise, it helps 
to improve overall efficiency significantly. 
Our method achieved the primary goal of this work. It completely eliminated the manual 
process involved in the disassembling phase, reduced the total running time by 70%, 
and significantly improved overall efficiency.  
8. Future Work 
We extracted only the code segment from the executables. It can be expanded to 
include data segment which will be challenging as it includes data in addition to the 
function codes we are interested. Also, our opcode table consists of fewer number of 1-
byte opcodes that are searched indiscriminately resulting in ~3% false positives. It can 
be further improved by analyzing the virus assembly files and determining conditions to 
identify 1-byte opcodes. 
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Appendix B: Converged HMM Matrices 
 
Table B- 1. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 2 and Test Set 0 
 N=2, M=14, T=65538 
 I 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  
A 0.97529089931559 0.02470910068450 
0.07294422965863 0.92705577034146 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 
and 
add 
mov 
cmp 
jz 
lea 
retn 
jnz 
jmp 
push 
pop 
xor 
test 
 
0.11056864271285             0.01032365432858 
0.01145967815425             0.00000000000000 
0.18800057580368             0.00039631434332 
0.21328078353347             0.95689813171848 
0.03301040979904             0.00000000000000 
0.06610252853323             0.00000000000000 
0.02880279179210             0.03238189960963 
0.06832909701597             0.00000000000000 
0.03691201145227             0.00000000000000 
0.04826955343759             0.00000000000000 
0.12836473711460             0.00000000000000 
0.02806701922270             0.00000000000000 
0.02414499033569             0.00000000000000 
0.01468718109252             0.00000000000000
  
 
Table B- 2. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 2 and Test Set 1 
 N=2, M=14, T=65637 
I 
 
 
0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000  
 
A 
 
 
0.99023469357353 0.00976530642649  
0.00517079384893 0.99482920615105  
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 
add 
cmp 
jz 
lea 
mov 
xor 
jnz 
jmp 
pop 
push 
retn 
and 
test 
  0.04138172849122 0.10732144082279  
0.03279131576133 0.19815336386213  
0.00713632659984 0.03265250124626  
0.00000000000000 0.07525014019944  
0.03353125642709 0.02783380289300  
0.78330672606554 0.20080176000483  
0.00000000000000 0.02768944552793  
0.00000000000000 0.04211587933240  
0.00000000000000 0.05519274352290  
0.00000000000000 0.03204064411089  
0.06899283786000 0.11016834858514  
0.03285980879498 0.06120574059315  
0.00000000000000 0.01328628016508  
0.00000000000000 0.01628790913408  
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Table B- 3. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 3 and Test Set 0 
 
 
N=3, M=14, T=65538 
I 0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  
 
A 
0.70346079377318 0.29653920622679 0.00000000000000  
0.07914393658555 0.91445966538834 0.00639639802613  
0.00962002852435 0.00000000000000 0.99037997147564  
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.18044259546229 0.08754297795188 0.04019049649330 
and 0.00448429829006 0.01540292005154 0.00000000000000 
add 0.03860749464897 0.24155284859017 0.03234418078082 
mov 0.02469929232564 0.25302357242172 0.78967988859470 
cmp 0.00315211876847 0.04250330460559 0.00707130426832 
jz 0.01007609703007 0.09340170221697 0.00000000000000 
lea 0.01364679545996 0.03187212163422 0.03343588672210 
retn 0.07481661944953 0.05715118751145 0.03145387119567 
jnz 0.00000000040173 0.05377853338374 0.00000000000000 
jmp 0.01349456618584 0.06643437646140 0.00000000000000 
push 0.49741215965854 0.00000000000000 0.06582437194508 
pop 0.13409826140688 0.00222230493117 0.00000000000000 
xor 0.00479799349001 0.03379418116171 0.00000000000000 
test 0.00027170742202 0.02131996907845 0.00000000000000 
  
 
Table B- 4. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 3 and Test Set 1 
 
 
N=3, M=14, T=65637 
 I 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  
 
A 
0.70346079377318 0.29653920622679 0.00000000000000  
0.07914393658555 0.91445966538834 0.00639639802613  
0.00962002852435 0.00000000000000 0.99037997147564  
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.08867756472923 0.17378980549424 0.03999032275435 
add 0.24121738466127 0.03794667554559 0.03246059846073 
cmp 0.04101184800289 0.00177478727713 0.00711025515134 
jz 0.09241896276235 0.01063289662025 0.00000000000000 
lea 0.03188667648912 0.01347452830663 0.03362093725516 
mov 0.25488566270350 0.02044655468201 0.78988948068637 
xor 0.03378862068065 0.00468934596868 0.00000000000000 
jnz 0.05332496381131 0.00025874665049 0.00000000000000 
jmp 0.06621929897186 0.01336997690319 0.00000000000000 
pop 0.00276033294822 0.13469898314905 0.00000000000000 
push 0.00000000000000 0.50857789021476 0.06538067722100 
retn 0.05831881713061 0.07320156127166 0.03154772847102 
and 0.01562700800442 0.00433427248924 0.00000000000000 
test 0.01986285910459 0.00280397542706 0.00000000000000 
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Table B- 5. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 4 and Test Set 0 
 
 
 
N=4, M=14, T=65538 
I 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  
A 
 
 
 
 
  0.44045057521127 0.53973027295562 0.00000000000000 0.01981915183314  
0.62792547362477 0.18618315452008 0.06922733549534 0.11666403635980  
0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.93607368937815 0.06392631062179  
0.34692889141062 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.65307110858937  
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.10436800534989 0.11822021256511 0.01027314932301 0.11612084862888  
and 0.01349976044783 0.01245313695031 0.00000000000000 0.00522868141933  
add 0.12144044526825 0.38719748586197 0.00028310901995 0.03441523285621  
mov 0.43023595328126 0.00000428494713 0.94952037682505 0.02275571968959  
cmp 0.06604882783370 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00688387326382  
jz 0.05917203374938 0.11726839434507 0.00000000000000 0.00244250914821 
lea 0.02271307888903 0.04655973578208 0.03992336483199 0.00178900787395  
retn 0.00000000261127 0.19447448317301 0.00000000000000 0.03303669112864  
jnz 0.04796843467275 0.04358686152385 0.00000000000000 0.00038036414313  
jmp 0.05028195162244 0.06789037513264 0.00000000000000 0.01315996772862  
push 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.64946985760290  
pop 0.01372077231028 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.10874111229134  
xor 0.03990062711514 0.01234502971883 0.00000000000000 0.00557613422539  
test 0.03065010684881 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  
 
 
 
Table B- 6. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 4 and Test Set 1 
 N=4, M=14, T=65637 
I 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000  
A 
 
 
 
0.80883316869008 0.06320914331696 0.03559313923522 0.09236454875772  
0.27355240608643 0.64178389969937 0.00000000000000 0.08466369421419  
0.00000000000000 0.05901229599492 0.94098770400506 0.00000000000000  
0.15518518785122 0.06191124864767 0.00000000000000 0.78290356350103  
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.12685046243687 0.11199929673836 0.00853612550654 0.07280030502653 
add 0.23323765834646 0.01851037291423 0.00000000000000 0.20897318307602  
cmp 0.00051981304233 0.02147360786514 0.00000000000000 0.09134592516609 
jz 0.00951432313309 0.01066382234148 0.00000000000000 0.19608849354750 
lea 0.04699127266348 0.00000000000000 0.02799478588275 0.02116523853286  
mov 0.41101127083640 0.00407452652008 0.96346908861070 0.05420224430150  
xor 0.01041078461638 0.00447553751546 0.00000000000000 0.05970641577765   
jnz 0.00847781584294 0.00075510653538 0.00000000000000 0.10764786651215  
jmp 0.02473783521184 0.01120702111540 0.00000000000000 0.11054120772494  
pop 0.00693284728153 0.12426754287804 0.00000000000000 0.00000000024898  
push 0.00000000000000 0.65300481051350 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  
retn 0.10885509567445 0.03444266696595 0.00000000000000 0.01633128223171  
and 0.00772252853900 0.00335420883476 0.00000000000000 0.0230884120800 
test 0.00473829237528 0.00177147926222 0.00000000000000 0.03810942577395  
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Table B- 7. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 5 and Test Set 0 
 
 
N=5, M=14, T=65538 
I 0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000   1.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  
A 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.9405214315319   0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000    0.05947856846809    0.00000000000000 
  0.1129644367010   0.70298632458623   0.09892001655545    0.05531723665474    0.02981198550257  
  0.0000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.79609378295742    0.06543191922219    0.13847429782046  
  0.0000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.12417740830274    0.61586286167349    0.25995973002377  
  0.0000000000000   0.16901480782446   0.10904631245805    0.06774692082023    0.65419195889725  
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.01056237299509     0.00000000151958     0.08555187476068    0.09267881503836    0.20923462951049   
and 0.00000000000000     0.01524718919793     0.02162219579171    0.00509363523682    0.00058701342624   
add 0.00000000000000     0.45736257029521     0.21841193435418    0.03472486592215    0.08567076329304  
mov 0.96541995985256     0.32951107919369     0.06029850748439    0.00000000000000    0.49279248754508  
cmp 0.00000000000000     0.00000000000000     0.07921147534479    0.01712096169939    0.00492726978894       
jz 0.00000000000000     0.01951138082775     0.17251284419881    0.00594289633036    0.00000000000000    
lea 0.02401766715236     0.09208425527757     0.04100052758162    0.00191262451608    0.00436475670059   
retn 0.00000000000000     0.04667059388427     0.02742919903069    0.02172002194133    0.15532636270807    
jnz 0.00000000000000     0.00000000000000     0.10327137331020    0.00000000000000    0.00000000000000   
jmp 0.00000000000000     0.01529291004272     0.09963315594656    0.00798581331095    0.02856757841450  
push 0.00000000000000     0.00000000000000     0.00000000000000    0.68180914402532    0.00000000000000   
pop 0.00000000000000     0.00000000000000     0.00131185622475    0.12620848711047    0.01281949026622    
xor 0.00000000000000     0.01730019345761     0.05199841067901    0.00480273486877    0.00570964834679   
test 0.00000000000000     0.00701982630365     0.03774664529266    0.00000000000000    0.00000000000000  
 
Table B- 8. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 5 and Test Set 1 
 N=5, M=14, T=65637 
I 
 
0.00000000000000   1.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  
A 
 
 
 
0.64262392510210    0.13305877596495  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.22431729893291 
0.07029776430647    0.83694713112539  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.09275510456816 
0.06593363140192    0.28377975032280  0.00686837680517  0.64341824147011  0.00000000000000  
0.06153810783160    0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.93846189216840  0.00000000000000  
0.05127506960621    0.07036255303579  0.0573136406037     0.00000000000000 0.82104873675419  
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.11414312762067   0.09178780664076  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.1212773367205       
add 0.01839111716720   0.22139415067586  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.2162526399498      
cmp 0.01902016801018   0.06980192768685  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.0010256620639           
jz 0.00531781714927   0.15392450397864  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.0082371275539        
lea 0.00107196862260   0.03455297850306  1.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.0000000000000      
mov 0.00170007141622   0.09216764637624  0.00000000000000  1.00000000000000  0.51117361573010     
xor 0.00372769157841   0.05030631107538  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.0078690458847        
jnz 0.00000000014669   0.09281179061727  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.0000000000000      
jmp 0.00986206845249   0.09799374859572  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.01665250939040          
pop 0.12110891030325   0.00168433880047  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00865846380033        
push 0.66134786029249   0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000          
retn 0.04108521449830   0.04076323009906  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.09930854452460          
and 0.00272393218346   0.02057069727973  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00652867029279          
test 0.00050005255879   0.03224086967097  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00301638408870  
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Table B- 9. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 6 and Test Set 0 
 
 
 
N=6, M=14, T=65538 
I 
 
 
0.00000000000000  1.00000000000000   0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.74654207880452   0.06015696292670   0.04465832656218   0.11643327108490   0.03220936062184   0.00000000000000  
0.02060514556199   0.78892780154198   0.05844976057459   0.00000000000000   0.13201729232145   0.00000000000000  
0.00000000000000   0.09872443224713   0.56509608986430   0.00000000000000   0.33617947788853   0.00000000000000  
0.00000000000000   0.24213284361941   0.00710552510345   0.00000000000000   0.02958095288687   0.72118067839026  
0.17068522563537   0.11758994250491   0.09298246310421   0.00000000000000   0.61874236875556   0.00000000000000  
0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.05739856445345   0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.94260143554657  
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
call 0.00000000000000  0.07963980903354 0.04474903481381 0.00000000000000 0.2726749917285 0.01054750258092  
and 0.01379599847082  0.02259540505228 0.00558907307631 0.00000000000000 0.0004359338601 0.00000000000000  
add 0.38675138566697  0.21282350028897 0.03986379770185 0.27309104766597 0.0739491617351 0.00000000000000  
mov 0.42371179827650  0.05194811358821 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.4178819850247 0.97785286398327  
cmp 0.00000000000000  0.08312910828087 0.01519714332158 0.00000000000000 0.0113982201845 0.00000000000000  
jz 0.02253365781221  0.17868171055175 0.00200425425423 0.00000000000000 0.0083749572690 0.00000000000000  
lea 0.00000000000000  0.03668926127124 0.00000000000000 0.72530432647419 0.0203587104885 0.01159963343582  
retn 0.08894246264290  0.02453665903854 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.1450387602515 0.00000000000000  
jnz 0.00000000000000  0.11272898499177 0.00000000000335 0.00000000000000 0.0000000000000 0.00000000000000  
jmp 0.03388174710212  0.10379847545280 0.00779811304391 0.00160462585985 0.0197130677633 0.00000000000000  
push 0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000 0.75945600474962 0.00000000000000 0.0000000000106 0.00000000000000  
pop 0.00000000000000  0.00002764719045 0.11947591062144 0.00000000000000 0.0278200833764 0.00000000000000  
xor 0.02053220621472  0.05507378660489 0.00586666841388 0.00000000000000 0.0023540626160 0.00000000000000  
test 0.00985074381389  0.03832753865470 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0000000656915 0.00000000000000  
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Table B- 10.  Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 6 and Test Set 1 
 
 N=6, M=14, T=65637 
I 
 
1.00000000000000  0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
0.79902575937822  0.06884299516905  0.00000000000000  0.00395962775884  0.06656516435248  0.06160645334139  
0.00004962226266  0.05402429439583  0.50987354539271  0.14656884949096  0.15294718165373  0.13653650680411  
0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.94315591906849  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.05684408093152  
0.21315790437331  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.49708269885924  0.21023608262221  0.07952331414521  
0.00001369512679  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.93787525245430  0.06052839468865  0.00158265773027  
0.27132909596639  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.02130601346098  0.06433438422900  0.64303050634357  
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Call    0.13186949046900  0.00000000000000   0.01033245540491  0.0960162971704    0.0414220481090    0.11261960836740 
Add   0.22409281811031  0.33135053413181   0.00000000000000   0.1833326392870   0.2675745644057    0.01850064871170 
Cmp  0.00325621138480  0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.0000000000000   0.2670579038232    0.01856606136724 
Jz       0.01673161748286  0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.2677942538386   0.0035045087466 0.00792665991814 
Lea    0.00529078865858  0.66864946586819   0.01319064156814   0.0182121989531   0.0567012442008 0.00065911286116 
Mov  0.43823259448582  0.00000000000000   0.97647690302694   0.0468122413825   0.0748684472089 0.00037493358845 
Xor    0.01264762393210  0.00000000000000   0.00000000000000   0.0294594620569   0.1089340239043 0.00559008139898 
Jnz     0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.1741889487909   0.0000000000000 0.00262644652140 
Jmp   0.03387824544811  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.1223503779078   0.0409882716703 0.01186122068469 
Pop   0.00890641093102  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.0000000000000   0.0053662408508 0.11957216373433 
Push 0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.0000000000000   0.0000000000791 0.66099864418808 
Retn 0.11157074655939  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.0308303051582   0.0137436214224 0.03607282455750 
And  0.01034303858470  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.0286673453200   0.0000000000000 0.00333377158292 
Test  0.00318041395330  0.00000000000000  0.00000000000000    0.0023359301341   0.1198391255784 0.00129782251794
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Appendix C: HMM Testing Results 
 
 
Figure C- 1 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 0 and N = 
2 
Source:  Author’s research 
 
Figure C- 2 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 1 and N = 
3 
Source:  Author’s research 
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Figure C- 3 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 3 and N = 
4 
Source:  Author’s research 
 
Figure C- 4  LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 3 and N = 
5 
Source:  Author 
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Figure C- 5 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 4 and N = 
6 
Source:  Author’s research 
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